Trying and Dying: Are Some Wishes at the End of LifeBetter Than Others? by Kim, OJ
Oliver J. Kim*  Trying and Dying:  Are Some Wishes at
 the End of Life Better Than Others?
In the United States, efforts to create a “right to try,” or to provide access for 
the terminally ill to try experimental drugs, have seen overwhelming success in 
passing state legislatures. This success provided the foundation for advocates’ 
long-term goal of a federal right to try. Yet proposals ranging from very modest 
advance-care-planning consultations to the “right to die,” or medical aid in dying, 
face steep political challenges despite seeming public support. 
This paper discusses the legal underpinnings of both “rights” and the current 
political and policy debate over each. More often than not, these “rights” are 
granted through legislation rather than judicial decisions, and the US Supreme 
Court has held that neither “right” can be found in the Constitution. This debate 
says a lot not only about politics in the United States but also our policies around 
autonomy at the end of life.
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Introduction
One of the most diffi cult and controversial issues for policymakers 
is how to ensure the law respects a patient’s wishes at the end of life. 
Some policymakers have proposed granting individuals suffering from 
terminal illness a “right to die,” or to seek medical assistance to end their 
life. Another policy proposal is the so-called “right to try,” or providing a 
means for terminally ill patients to request experimental drugs that have 
not completed clinical trials to demonstrate they are safe and effective. 
Essentially, both policies purport to give individuals more autonomy at the 
end of life, but Congress and the majority of states have passed right-to-
try bills while proposals ranging from very modest advance-care-planning 
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consultations to the right to die, or medical aid in dying, often face steep 
political challenges despite strong public support.1 
Notably when either “right” has been granted, it generally has been by 
the legislature, not the judiciary. For better or for worse, such grants inject 
a political element into the creation of that right. Here, the debate says a 
lot, not only about politics in the United States, but also about our policies 
around end-of-life decision-making. While we want a society that values 
life, we also want a society that empowers individuals to make their own 
decisions, particularly about their health and well-being. 
The division between the two issues can be illustrated by two 
unrelated legislative initiatives that were being debated in Congress almost 
simultaneously in 2015. In one chamber, the House of Representatives 
overwhelmingly passed the 21st Century Cures Act, 2 legislation mainly 
aimed at increasing research funding and streamlining the drug and device 
approval process. Tucked within this massive bill was an attempted 
compromise around a right to try. 3 In the other chamber, the Senate 
unanimously passed a reauthorization of the Older Americans Act,4 a 
fi fty-year old package of authorizations for aging programs ranging 
from nutrition to legal services to caregiver supports. But an amendment 
to authorize resources to service organizations to provide end-of-life 
counseling, or advance care planning, failed to be included.5 While it 
is unclear from the statement from the amendment’s sponsor why the 
amendment failed to be included,6 an observer of American politics may 
1. Paige Winfi eld Cunningham, “Legalizing assisted suicide has stalled at every level,” Washington 
Post (24 October 2017), online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-
health-202/2017/10/24/the-health-202-legalizing-assisted-suicide-has-stalled-at-every-level/59ee109
330fb045cba000973/>.
2. H.R. 6, 114th Cong. (2015). US Bill HR 6, 21st Century Cures Act, 114 Cong, 2015.
3. Andy Taylor & Alison Bateman-House, “Right to try misses the real issue. There is another 
solution,” (20 December 2016), The Hill (blog), online: <thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/
healthcare/311259-right-to-try-misses-the-real-issue-there-is-another-solution> (discussing an 
attempt by the provision’s authors to create “unglamorous but effective bipartisan solutions that will 
help patients now and in the future by giving them better information and providing transparency into 
the expanded access process”).
4. US, Bill S 192, Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016, 114th Cong, 2016.
5. US, Cong Rec, daily ed, vol 161, 111 at S 5154 (16 July 2015) (statement of Sen. Sheldon 
Whitehouse on the Older Americans Act).
6. Ibid (referencing “diffi culties” with including the amendment).
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wonder if the amendment failed due to lingering concerns over claims of 
“death panels”7 hurting the chances of passing an otherwise uncontroversial 
bill.
This article discusses the legal underpinnings of both rights and the 
current political and policy debate over each. First, Part I will discuss the 
development of the right to try; this discussion necessitates a brief review 
of the drug development and approval process in the United States. Second, 
Part II will review efforts to pass end-of-life policies from educating 
individuals about end-of-life choices to state laws to provide medical aid 
in dying. Part III will then compare and contrast the competing rights and 
discuss where advocates for greater end-of-life policies could learn from 
the right-to-try movement. My hope is that analyzing this debate is not 
only instructive in the American legal and political debate but also informs 
other countries’ discussions over end-of-life policy-making. 8
 I. The right to try and its impact on the drug approval process in the 
United States 
Prescription drugs are a critical part of many healthcare systems, including 
the United States where drugs consume ten percent of the country’s total 
healthcare spending.9 Drugs have increased longevity, and given their 
importance in the lives of many Americans, our federal government has 
attempted to balance the availability of new drugs with an approval process 
7. The term “death panels” refers to a claim made in opposition to the Affordable Care Act that 
passing a national health reform bill would lead to rationing of care and that an early version’s proposal 
to include reimbursement for end-of-life consultations would lead to such panels. Don Gonyea, “From 
the Start, Obama Struggled With Fallout From A Kind of Fake News,” NPR Politics (10 January 2017), 
online: <www.npr.org/2017/01/10/509164679/> (providing an overview of the term and its effect). As 
discussed below, such consultations were eventually allowed years later. Compare Robert Pear, “New 
Medicare Rule Authorizes ‘End-of-Life’ Consultations,” New York Times (30 October 2015), online: 
<www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/new-medicare-rule-authorizes-end-of-life-consultations.html> 
(discussing how Medicare would pay for “consultations with patients on how they would like to be 
cared for as they are dying” six years following the “death panels” debate) with Avik Roy, “Death 
Panels Through the Back Door,” National Review (29 December 2010), online: <www.nationalreview.
com/critical-condition/death-panels-through-back-door-avik-roy/> (criticizing a prior proposal to 
have Medicare pay for such consultations “because it has every incentive to encourage the elderly to 
‘pull the plug’ instead of encouraging them to fi ght to stay alive”).
8. For example of scholarship on these debates outside the United States, see as examples Denise 
Meyerson, “Medical Negligence Determinations, the ‘Right to Try,’ and Expanded Access to 
Innovative Treatments,” (2017) 14:3 J Bioethical Inquiry 385; Barbara von Tigerstrom & Emily Harris, 
“Access to Experimental Treatments: Comparative Analysis of Three Special Access Regimes,” 24 JL 
& Medicine 119 (2016); Elizabeth Woods, “The Right to Die With Dignity With the Assistance of a 
Physician: An Anglo, American and Australian International Perspective,” (1998) 4:2 ILSA J Int’l & 
Comp L 817.
9. National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, “Health 
Expenditures” (3 May 2017), online: <www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/health-expenditures.htm> (fi nding 
that 10.1% of the national health expenditures goes toward prescription drugs).
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that protects the public’s health from unsafe and dangerous products. At 
issue are the political, policy, and ethical issues that determine where the 
law should strike this balance. 
 1. The history and basic structure of the drug approval process in the 
United States
Beginning with the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act,10 the American federal 
government has exercised increasing control over the sale, marketing, 
and production of pharmaceutical products, often in response to public 
outcry. For instance, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act11 
in response to over a hundred people dying from an elixir that contained 
antifreeze, and this act ushered in the modern American drug regulatory 
process. 12 The new law provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
with regulatory authority to require pre-market approval for new drugs with 
the burden on the drug maker to prove to the FDA that its drug was safe 
before it could be sold. 13 Congress increased the FDA’s scrutiny by adding 
proof of effi cacy with the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment, which was 
passed in response to public outrage over the sedative thalidomide. 14 
Today, the FDA serves as a “gatekeeper” 15 to protect public health 
by using its regulatory authority over the drug approval process. 16 To 
obtain such approval, a drugmaker must go through several stages of 
clinical trials—often time-consuming and expensive—before a product 
can receive approval for sale.17 First, after testing a potential product on 
animals and other methods, a company can fi le for an investigational 
new drug (IND) application to begin to clinical trials on human subjects. 
10. Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub L No 59-384, 34 Stat 768 (1906).
11. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub L No 75-717, 52 Stat 1040 (1938).
12. Michelle Meadows, “Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years,” FDA Consumer 
(January 2006), online:  <www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/FOrgsHistory/
CDER/UCM586463.pdf>.
13. Ibid. However, as a compromise with the drug industry at the time, the FDA had six months to 
respond to an application; if the FDA failed to object to the application within the statutory timeframe, 
it would be considered approved.
14. Ibid.
15. Patricia Zettler, “Pharmaceutical Federalism,” (2017) 92:3 Ind LJ 845 at 857-858.
16. 21 USC § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce 
any new drug, unless an approval of an application…is effective with respect to such drug.”)  The 
FDA has expedited processes to allow for the approval of generic drugs, 21 USC § 355(j), and the 
sale of over-the-counter medicines, Consumer Healthcare Products Association, “FAQs About the 
Regulation of OTC Medicines,” online: <www.chpa.org/FAQsRegOTCs.aspx> (discussing the use of 
drug monographs in lieu of FDA pre-approval for the sale of over-the-counter drugs, or drugs available 
without a prescription).
17. US, Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Examination of Clinical Trial Costs and Barriers for Drug Development (25 July 
2014), online: <aspe.hhs.gov>.
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In essence, the FDA is issuing a narrow approval of this experimental 
drug solely for the participants in the clinical trial. 18 After three phases of 
clinical trials involving increasing numbers of subjects, the company can 
submit its results for a new drug application (NDA). The FDA reviews the 
NDA to determine the safety and effectiveness in the drug’s proposed use, 
the appropriateness of the drug’s proposed labeling, and the adequacy of 
manufacturing methods to assure the drug’s identity, strength, quality, and 
purity.  Even if the FDA approves a NDA, that may not be the fi nal step: 
while all drugmakers are supposed to report post-market adverse events 
to the FDA, the FDA can require a drugmaker to conduct post-approval, 
post-market studies of drugs.
 2. Efforts to allow patients to take drugs not yet approved
The FDA’s extensive authority over drug approval and marketing has 
not gone unchallenged. 19 While Congress and the public have demanded 
greater regulatory authority during times of crises, the pendulum has 
swung toward deregulation when the public feels that the FDA’s process 
has slowed or even blocked access to life-saving medicine. Right-to-try 
advocates have tried administrative, legislative, and judicial remedies in 
their efforts to expand access to experimental drugs.
 a. Administrative remedies: FDA allowance for expanded use/
compassionate use for people not in clinical trials
Given its role in the drug approval process, the FDA must balance its 
role in protecting public health and safety with expediting approval of 
new drugs and devices for patients in need.20 Some patient advocates 
have expressed frustration with what they see as government bureaucracy 
holding back scientifi c breakthroughs. Within the constraints of its 
authorizing legislation, the FDA has attempted to address these frustrations 
by allowing for the “compassionate use” of experimental drugs still in the 
clinical-trial phase.21
18.  Susan Thaul, “Access to Unapproved Drugs: FDA Policies on Compassionate Use and 
Emergency Use Authorization,” Congressional Research Service Report (4 August 2015).
19. Zettler, supra note 15 at 849-850; Lars Noah, “State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure 
of Pharmaceutical Products,” (2016) Mich State L Rev 1 at 2-27.
20. US, Food & Drug Administration, “Expanded Access (Compassionate Use)” (3 October 2017), 
online: <www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/default.
htm> (“Ensuring patient safety is a priority—FDA must determine that the potential patient benefi t 
justifi es the potential risk of the expanded access use of the investigational drug, and that the potential 
risk is not unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition to be treated. Even with safeguards, 
there may be signifi cant unknowns about safety and effectiveness.”)
21. Ibid.
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 Becoming more formalized in the 1980s in response to the AIDS 
crisis,22 the FDA began allowing for IND exemptions to allow drugmakers 
to give experimental drugs to seriously ill patients. However, the FDA 
cannot compel a drugmaker to provide the experimental drug to the 
patient; essentially, the drugmaker basically is agreeing to provide the 
experimental drug under a new IND for “expanded access”23 or a “protocol 
amendment”24 to the clinical trial. 25 Spurred by increasing congressional 
scrutiny26 and criticism that compassionate-use applications were too 
complicated for many patients and their physicians,27 the FDA has tried 
to make the process simpler for patients to use.28 The new form is a single 
page to be fi lled out and submitted by the patient’s physician to the FDA 
for a 30-day review;29 however, the physician can expedite the process if 
the patient’s situation is so dire that 30 days is too long.30 According to its 
online reports on compassionate-use requests, the FDA approves nearly all 
the requests it receives. 31
Despite the revisions and the FDA’s approval of nearly all 
compassionate-use requests, right-to-try proponents argue that the 
22. Laura Kimberly et al, “Pre-approval Access Terminology: A Cause for Confusion and a Danger 
to Patients,” (2017) 51:4 Therapeutic Innovation & Regulatory Science 494 at 495.
23. “Expanded Access,” supra note 20.
24. US, Food & Drug Administration, “Investigational New Drug (IND) Application” (5 October 2017), 
online: <www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm>.
25. Alexander Gaffney, “From 100 Hours to 1: FDA Dramatically Simplifi es its Compassionate 
Use Process,” Regulatory Affairs Professional Society, Regulatory Focus (4 February 2015), 
online: <www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/02/04/21243/From-100-Hours-to-1-FDA-
Dramatically-Simplifi es-its-Compassionate-Use-Process/>.
26. Christina Sandefur, “Safeguarding the Right to Try,” (2017) 49:2 Ariz St LJ 513 at 552 (“In June 
2014, it inspired an investigation of the FDA’s compassionate use process by Senators Tom Coburn, 
Richard Burr, and Lamar Alexander, and the introduction of a bill in the House of Representatives to 
prevent the FDA from blocking implementation of any state right-to-try law. In May 2016, the U.S. 
Senate held hearings on the issue of access to investigational drugs, and a Senate bill complementing 
the House proposal was introduced that same month.”)
27. Richard A Moscicki, “Important steps toward streamlining access to investigational drugs 
for patients in need,” (21 June 2016) FDA Voice (blog), online: <blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.
php/2016/06/important-steps-toward-streamlining-access-to-investigational-drugs-for-patients-in-
need/>.
28. Gaffney, supra note 25.
29. Individual Patient Expanded Access Applications: Form FDA 3926; Draft Guidance for 
Industry; Availability, 80:27 Fed Reg 7318 (2015).
30. Gaffney, supra note 25.
31. The FDA has made publically available the number of requests and approvals since 
2010 at “Expanded Access INDs and Protocols,” online: <http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/drugandbiologicapprovalreports/
indactivityreports/ucm373560.htm>. In 2015, for example, the FDA approved the vast majority of 
these requests: over 99 percent of nearly 1,900 applications in 2015. Ed Silverman, “21st Century 
Cures would require pharma to post policies on experimental drugs,” STAT Pharmalot (28 November 
2016), online: <https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/28/21st-century-experimental-drugs/>. 
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compassionate-use process still too burdensome for terminally ill patients. 32 
Even if nearly all the requests are approved, proponents argue that it is 
impossible to know how many patients and physicians did not apply for 
a compassionate-use exemption because of concerns about time or the 
complexity of the process.33 Congress, too, has criticized the FDA because 
there is insuffi cient evidence to determine whether its compassionate-use 
policy is effective. 34 However, the FDA itself can only do so much because 
it not only needs to protect the integrity of the clinical-trial process but 
also must follow its authorizing statute regarding who can and cannot take 
a drug that has not yet been approved.35 
 b. Failed attempts at judicial remedies
In addition to pressuring the FDA directly, right-to-try proponents have 
challenged the agency’s decisions through the courts. In United States 
v Rutherford,36 a group of cancer patients sued the FDA to allow them 
access to Laetrile, a controversial substance that had not been approved by 
the FDA but was being used by these patients to aid their treatment.37 The 
Supreme Court sided with the FDA, deferring to the agency’s interpretation 
of the authorizing statute as reasonable and noting the legislative history 
strongly supported the FDA’s mission to ensure the safety of drugs for all 
patients, including those with a terminal illness.38
Years later, the Abigail Alliance, a patient advocacy organization, 
brought a different claim against the FDA by arguing the agency was 
32. Christina Corieri, “Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill to Take 
Control of their Treatment,” Goldwater Institute Policy Report 266 (11 February 2014) (proposing 
legislative fi ndings for a bill).
33. Silverman, supra note 31.
34. Letter from US Senators Lamar Alexander, Tom Coburn, & Richard Burr to Margaret Hamburg, 
Commissioner of the FDA (16 June 2014), published in US Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions, “Senators Ask FDA about Expanded Access Program in Response to Patient 
Concerns,” (18 June 2014), online:  <https://www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/senators-ask-
fda-about-expanded-access-program-in-response-to-patient-concerns>; US Congressman Michael 
McCaul, Press Release “McCaul Language to Explore ‘Compassionate Use’ Passes Appropriations 
Committee,” (30 May 2014), online: <http://mccaul.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/mccaul-
language-to-explore-compassionate-use-passes-appropriations>.
35. Supra note 20. Even if the FDA does grant a compassionate use exemption, it cannot compel the 
drug maker to make the experimental drug available. US, Food and Drug Administration, Expanded 
Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use—Questions and Answers, (October 2017) at 17; 
Silverman, supra note 31.
36. 442 US 544 (1979).
37. Morton Mintz, “Supreme Court enters quarrel over Laetrile,” Washington Post (23 January 
1979), online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/01/23/supreme-court-enters-
quarrel-over-laetrile/871f8e04-8380-4c89-b6be-5d2ed752d55c/?utm_term=.2e323b24e1e3>.
38. Rutherford 442 US, supra note 36 at 553. (“In implementing the statutory scheme, the FDA has 
never made exception for drugs used by the terminally ill. As this Court has often recognized, the 
construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.”)
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violating terminally-ill patients’ fundamental rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment by denying them access to experimental drugs.39 In particular, 
the Abigail Alliance noted that the FDA was conceding that these drugs 
were “safe and promising enough” to be available for some patients—the 
ones participating in the clinical trials.40 
Although the plaintiffs won their initial appeal, the DC Circuit 
ultimately ruled en banc that there was no constitutional right at risk and 
thus the plaintiffs did not have a claim that relief could be granted. The 
DC Circuit began by tracing the evolution of the drug approval process as 
part of “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practice.”41 The court 
noted that Congress rejected the drug industry’s claim that Americans 
would lose “the right to self-medication” when it passed the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act—a claim that paralleled the Abigail Alliance’s central 
argument.42 And even if Congress did not include effi cacy as part of the 
FDA’s review until the 1962 amendments, the court reasoned that the arc 
of history moved towards protecting the public by adopting policy changes 
to keep up with scientifi c developments.43
Further, the court noted that terminally-ill patients do not need to 
wait until a clinical trial is over because the “FDA and Congress have 
created several programs designed to provide early access to promising 
experimental drugs when warranted.”44 Thus, there was a remedy that 
had been created within the appropriate “arena of public debate and 
legislative action,” not by the “policy preferences” of the judiciary.45 The 
court concluded that the Abigail Alliance’s “arguments about morality, 
quality of life, and acceptable levels of medical risk are certainly ones that 
can be aired in the democratic branches, without injecting the courts into 
unknown questions of science and medicine.”46 Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court denied cert, essentially leaving Abigail Alliance as the fi nal decision 
on whether terminally ill patients have a substantive due process right to 
access experimental drugs.  
39. Abigail Alliance, Better Access v von Eschenbach, 495 F (3d) 695 (DC Cir 2007) (en banc).
40. Ibid at 701-703. The plaintiffs’ argument seemingly suggests that but for the FDA’s regulatory 
restrictions, the drug maker would provide the experimental drugs to terminally ill patients.
41. Ibid at 703.
42. Ibid at 705.
43. Ibid at 706-707.
44. Ibid at 698-699; also Section I(B)(1) above.
45. Abigail Alliance, ibid at 702.
46. Ibid at 713.
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 c. Statutory changes—21st Century Cures Act and pending debate
With no judicial recognition of a right to try experimental drugs and 
frustration with the FDA’s administrative process for compassionate use, 
patient advocates turned to the legislative process for relief. This advocacy 
led to the right-to-try movement, which has seen remarkable success at the 
state and federal level. While the initial state laws could not change the 
federal drug approval process and may have been on questionable legal 
and policy grounds, they provided a successful foundation for political 
pressure on Congress to enact a statutory change.
 State legislation 
Beginning with Colorado in 2014, a majority of states have enacted “right-
to-try” laws, which follow model legislation drafted by the libertarian 
Goldwater Institute. 47 One draft of the Goldwater model legislation is 
explicitly critical of the FDA drug approval process: “The use of available 
investigational drugs, biological products, and devices is a decision that 
should be made by the patient with a terminal disease in consultation with 
his or her physician not a decision to be made by the government.”48 
Under the model legislation, patients are only eligible for this 
statutory-created “right” if they meet certain criteria: the patient must 
be suffering from an “[a]dvanced illness…that, without life-sustaining 
procedures, will soon result in death;” have consulted with a physician 
and considered all other options currently approved by the FDA; have 
been given a prescription or a recommendation from a physician for an 
experimental drug; and have given written informed consent to take the 
experimental drug.49 The model does allow the drugmaker to charge 
for any costs associated with the production of the experimental drug.50 
Lastly, the model provides immunity for health professionals from the 
relevant licensing boards for recommending, prescribing, or administering 
the experimental drug.51
47. Goldwater Institute, “Right to Try Model Legislation,” online: <https://goldwaterinstitute.
org/wp-content/uploads/cms_page_media/2015/1/28/RIGHT%20TO%20TRY%20MODEL%20
LEGISLATION%20(2)_1.pdf> (hereinafter “Model Legislation”). Note that there have been prior 
attempts to legislate greater access to experimental drugs. Susan Okie, “Access before Approval—A 
Right to Take Experimental Drugs?” (2006) 355:5 New Eng J Med 437 at 439 (discussing a 2005 U.S. 
Senate bill that would allow terminally ill to obtain any drug that had gone through the fi rst phase of 
clinical trials). 
48. Corieri, supra note 32 at 2 (proposing legislative fi ndings for a bill) (emphasis added).
49. Model Legislation, supra note 47 at section 1.
50. Ibid at Section 2. The FDA also limits what a drug maker can charge for experimental drugs in a 
clinical trial. 21 CFR § 312.8 (2009).
51. Model Legislation, supra note 47 at section 5.
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However, the legislation contains a number of legal and structural 
fl aws that make effectuating the right to try diffi cult. The model right-
to-try legislation explicitly does not mandate drugmakers to actually 
provide the experimental drug.52 Drugmakers may have many reasons 
for not supplying an experimental drug to individuals outside the clinical 
trials.53 Even if the company does agree to supply the patient with the 
drug, the company can charge the patient for all costs associated with the 
experimental drug, and the legislation explicitly states the patient’s insurer 
is not required to cover any costs associated with the experimental drug.54 
This fi nancial situation is very different from patients who are actually 
in a clinical trial.55 Given these high hurdles, it is not clear if any patient 
actually has been aided by a state right-to-try law. 56
Second, there is only so much that a state statute can accomplish in an 
area as heavily regulated by the federal government as the drug approval 
and marketing process. 57 In the American federalist system, states can 
be preempted from regulating in an area when the federal government 
is lawfully exercising its regulatory authority as either the exclusive 
regulator or because it is regulating an area so expansively that there is no 
52. Ibid at Section 2.
53. Silverman, supra note 31. (“For instance, an unexpected patient reaction may jeopardize the 
chance that a clinical trial will succeed or a company may lack suffi cient supplies of their drug.”); 
Laurie McGinley, “Are right-to-try laws a last hope for dying patients—or a false hope?,” Washington 
Post (26 March 2017), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/are-right-to-
try-laws-a-last-hope-for-dying-patients--or-a-cruel-sham/2017/03/26/1aa49c7c-10a2-11e7-ab07-
07d9f521f6b5_story.html?utm_term=.fc64c292ae4e> (“Manufacturers, they say, don’t like to provide 
experimental therapies in part because they don’t want to be besieged by desperate patients but also 
because of the potential cost involved.”); Okie, supra note 47 at 440 (noting that manufacturing 
capacity is a limitation for drug makers “[e]specially in very early phases, [because] the company may 
still be working out how to manufacture the product”).
54. Model Legislation, supra note 47 at sections 3 and 7. There may be other costs, too, such as 
institutional review board reviews. Meyerson, supra note 8 at 395.
55. See infra notes 84-87.
56. NYU Langone Health Working Group on Compassionate Use and Pre-Approval Access, “How 
many patients have been helped by right-to-try laws so far?,” online: <med.nyu.edu/pophealth/
divisions/medical-ethics/compassionate-use#Q11>. (“To the best of our knowledge, no patients have 
been spared from death by right to try laws.”)
57. Caitlyn Martin, “Questioning the ‘Right’ in State Right to Try Laws: Assessing the Legality and 
Effectiveness of These Laws,” (2016) 77:1 Ohio St LJ 159 at 178-181 (discussing express and implied 
preemption of state laws particularly in the context of regulating drugs); see also PLIVA v Mensing, 
564 US 604 at 611-624 (2011) (fi nding that federal regulations on generic drug labelling preempted a 
state tort claim). There are examples, however, of state regulatory efforts, often in the area of product 
liability or medical practice, that challenge the conventional wisdom of federal preemption in this 
area. Zettler, supra note 15 at 861-888 (discussing different state regulatory schemes, including the 
right to try, that were justifi ed under traditional state powers of regulating product liability and the 
practice of medicine); Noah, supra note 19 at 4-26 (discussing state attempts to ban the sale of an 
FDA-approved drug); Meyerson, supra note 8 at 397.
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room for state regulation.58 Proponents argue that state right-to-try laws 
complement, rather than try to supplant, the FDA process and thus are 
not preempted. 59 Although it is an open question whether state right-to-try 
laws are preempted by the FDA’s authority, 60 a court potentially could fi nd 
the FDA compassionate-use process has implicitly preempted state right-
to-try laws because it is the exclusive means for obtaining access to these 
experimental drugs.61 Regardless, the overwhelming response in the states 
set the foundation for seeking federal policy,62 and a federal law could 
address any potential legal concerns.63
 Federal legislation
The same political forces that infl uenced efforts at the state level similarly 
have moved Congress to pressure the FDA to revise its compassionate-use 
policy and even to introduce legislation to authorize a federal right to try.64 
At the same time, new when conservative leadership in Congress65 and 
the federal government66 favored greater deregulation. Thus, the political 
58. Martin, ibid.
59. Meyerson, supra note 8 at 397. (“It is possible to comply with both the Right to Try laws and 
the FDA regulations, since the state laws do not oblige anyone to violate federal law by providing 
access to investigational products outside of FDA processes.”); Zettler, supra note 15 at 851. (“Today, 
the federal government rigorously regulates drugs—drugs generally cannot be sold, prescribed, or 
dispensed to patients until the federal government determines that they are safe and effective.”)
60. Ellen Black, “State ‘Right to Try’ Acts: A Good Start, but a Federal Act is Necessary,” (2016) 
45:3 Sw L Rev 719 at 743. (“As many legal scholars have argued, it appears likely that the right to try 
acts are impliedly preempted by the FDA regulations.”); Martin, supra note 57 at 182-183. (“Right to 
Try laws, however, remove safeguards governing the accessibility of drugs by circumventing the FDA 
altogether.”) 
61. Martin, supra note 57 at 178-85; see also Rutherford, 442 US supra note 37 at 558 (1979). (“To 
accept the proposition that the safety and effi cacy standards of the Act have no relevance for terminal 
patients is to deny the Commissioner’s authority over all drugs.”) 
62. Meyerson, supra note 8 at 397 (noting that regardless of legality under the US Constitution, state 
laws’ “real objective is to exert pressure on the federal government to revisit the issue of access”).
63. Black, supra note 60 at 751-752. 
64. Supra note 34 and infra note 67; see also Sam Adriance, “Fighting for the ‘Right to Try’ 
Unapproved Drugs: Law as Persuasion,” (2014) 124 Yale LJ Forum 148 at 149 (arguing that “even 
when federal law ensures that states lack legal power to alter substantive law meaningfully, state 
actors can still use their legislative processes to promote their desired policies and constitutional 
interpretations at the federal level”).
65. Deborah Mazer & Gregory Curfman, “21st Century Cures Act Lowers Confi dence in FDA-
Approved Drugs and Devices,” (14 February 2017) Health Affairs Blog, online: <healthaffairs.org/
blog/2017/02/14/21st-century-cures-act-lowers-confi dence-in-fda-approved-drugs-and-devices/>; 
Public Citizen, “Stop the 21st Century Cures Bill,” online: <www.citizen.org/our-work/health-and-
safety/stopping-legislative-attacks-fda-regulation>.
66. Renée Landers, “Scott Gottlieb’s fervor for deregulation could harm patients,” STAT (16 March 
2017), online: <www.statnews.com/2017/03/16/scott-gottlieb-fda-deregulation/>; Sheila Kaplan, 
“Trump order on regulations could create hurdles for FDA, Cures Act,” STAT (30 January 2017), 
online: <www.statnews.com/2017/01/30/fda-regulations-executive-order-trump/>.
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climate was ripe to successfully push Congress to pass legislation to create 
a federal right to try in 2018. 67 
Although the federal right-to-try law explicitly retains the 
compassionate-use process,68 it creates a new national process for patients 
to request access from a drug maker directly without seeking FDA approval. 
The federal right-to-try law defi nes an eligible patient as one who has been 
diagnosed with a life-threatening disease or condition; 69 has exhausted 
approved treatment options and cannot participate in the experimental 
drug’s clinical trial, as certifi ed by a physician in good standing and who 
is not receiving any direct compensation from the drugmaker; and has 
given written informed consent.70 The law also lifts a potential barrier for 
many drugmakers by prohibiting the FDA from using “a clinical outcome 
associated with the use of an eligible investigational drug pursuant to” 
the Johnson bill.71 It precludes liability for the drugmaker and the health 
professional who prescribes or dispenses the experimental drug without 
a showing of misconduct, gross negligence, or similar intentional tort.72 
Finally, the federal right-to-try law explicitly states the drugmaker is not 
liable if it decides not to provide access to an experimental drug,73 and this 
protection is further buttressed by legislative intent explicitly stating that 
67. US Bill S 204, Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right 
to Try Act, 115th Cong, 2017 (enacted). The legislation’s sponsor, Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, 
has had a long-standing interest in the right to try. See US, Connecting Patients to New and Potential 
Life Saving Treatments: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government 
Affairs, 114th Cong (2016), online: <www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/connecting-patients-to-new-
and-potential-life-saving-treatments> (hosting a hearing on access to experimental drugs). Johnson 
used a procedural mechanism to held up a reauthorization of the FDA’s user fee program in order to 
pass his bill through the Senate. Sarah Karlin-Smith & Seung Min Kim, “Senate approves ‘right-to-
try’ drug bill,” Politico (3 August 2017), online: <www.politico.com/story/2017/08/03/senate-right-
to-try-drug-bill-241293>. Although the House passed an alternate version that was favored by the 
FDA, the House ultimately passed the Johnson version. Erin Mershon, “Congress passes ‘right-to-try’ 
measure, sending hard-fought bill to Trump’s desk,” STAT (22 May 2018), online: <https://www.
statnews.com/2018/05/22/house-vote-right-to-try/>.
68. Ibid, S 204 § 3(4) (stating that the Johnson bill “is consistent with, and will act as an alternative 
pathway alongside, existing expanded access policies”).
69. Ibid, S 204 § 2(a) refers to 21 CFR § 312.81 to defi ne “life-threatening” as “(1) Diseases or 
conditions where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted; and (2) 
Diseases or conditions with potentially fatal outcomes, where the end point of clinical trial analysis is 
survival.” This defi nition is different than the standard set in the Goldwater model legislation because 
the disease does not need to be terminal where the threat of death is imminent. 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid § 2(c). However, the Johnson bill does allow the FDA to consider such data if it is found 
to be “critical to determining the safety of” the experimental drug or if the drug maker requests its 
inclusion. 
72. Ibid § 2(b).
73. Ibid.
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Congress does not intend the legislation to establish a new entitlement or 
a new mandate.74
Not everyone supported these developments as many ethicists, 
scientists, former regulatory offi cials,75 and even patient and consumers 
groups raised policy and ethical concerns about how a federal right to try 
would affect the drug approval process. 76 Patient advocates have noted 
that because experimental drugs are still in clinical trials, drugmakers may 
not know the full extent of “worst outcomes.” 77 By including the FDA 
through the compassionate-use process, patients may receive critical 
information and reduce risk of harm because of the FDA’s greater access 
to data from its work with multiple drugmakers. 78 Some right-to-try critics 
also have noted that drugmakers may also have their own policies when 
to grant a compassionate use exemption,79 and in response to concerns 
74. Ibid § 3.
75. Laurie McGinley, “Former FDA commissioners say right-to-try bills could endanger ‘vulnerable 
patients,’” Washington Post (18 March 2018), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2018/03/18/former-fda-commissioners-say-right-to-try-bills-could-endanger-vulnerable-
patients/?utm_term=.1c79b3da02b7> (discussing a letter signed by two FDA commissioners 
appointed by President Obama and two appointed by President George W. Bush).
76. Rachel Roubein, “Patient groups criticize ‘right to try’ bill on experimental drugs,” The Hill 
(13 March 2018), online: <thehill.com/policy/healthcare/378127-patient-groups-criticize-right-to-
try-bill-on-experimental-drugs> (noting that more than 75 patient organizations wrote congressional 
leadership opposing right-to-try legislation); Andy Taylor & Alison Bateman-House, “Right to try 
misses the real issue. There is another solution,” (12 December 2016) The Hill (blog), online: <thehill.
com> (discussing opposition in the patient and research community for ethical and scientifi c reasons).
77. Bob Tedeschi, “With patients demanding experimental drugs, ‘right to try’ is becoming the law 
of the land,” STAT (23 March 2017), online: <www.statnews.com/2017/03/23/right-to-try/>. Despite 
the President’s support for a right to try, FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb voiced concerns about such 
a policy for many of the reasons cited elsewhere in this paper. Shannon Firth, “FDA Head Expresses 
Doubt About ‘Right to Try,’” MedPage Today (4 October 2017), online: <www.medpagetoday.
com/washington-watch/fdageneral/68310>. Since the bill’s passage into law, however, Gottlieb has 
signalled that the agency would “stand ready to implement this legislation in a way that achieves 
Congress’ intent to promote access and protect patients.” FDA Press Announcements, “Statement from 
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on the signing of the Right to Try Act,” (30 May 2018), 
online: <www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm609258.htm>.
78. Ibid; Arthur Caplan & Alison Bateman-House, “The FDA is an Integral Part of Compassionate 
Use,” Forbes (6 July 2017), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/arthurcaplan/2017/07/06/the-fda-is-the-
most-important-part-of-compassionate-use/amp/> (noting that even well-meaning health professionals 
attempting to access an experimental drug without the FDA “may not know to look out for certain 
side effects—because the only people who know about them are employees at a rival company that’s 
testing a similar product and the FDA staffer to whom they had to report them. And in the worst-case 
scenarios, the doctor may not be brilliant or well-meaning but rather looking to sell to a patient an 
investigational medicine in which he has a fi nancial stake or even that he outright knows is a piece of 
junk.”)
79. Ed Silverman, “Lawmaker Plans a Bill to Force Pharma to Disclose Compassionate Use Info,” Wall 
Street Journal: Pharmalot (blog) (31 October 2014), online: <blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2014/10/31/
lawmaker-plans-a-bill-to-force-pharma-to-disclose-compassionate-use-info/>.
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that fi nding such policies were diffi cult if not impossible to discern,80 
Congress included a provision in the 21st Century Cures Act to make drug 
makers’ policies more transparent and accessible.81 Unlike the Goldwater 
model legislation that is aimed at removing the FDA from requests for 
experimental drugs, the Cures mandate requires drugmakers to make their 
policies on compassionate use of experimental drugs public available 
through such means as posting the policy on the company website.82
Additionally, ethicists and health professionals argue that right-to-try 
laws create false expectations for patients,83 especially since patients may 
not realize even under right-to-try laws, “[d]rug companies don’t have to 
give them the medicine, and insurance companies don’t have to pay for it.” 84 
Patients seeking aid through the right to try are in a very different situation 
than those in clinical trials, which may provide statutory protections and 
contractual guarantees. The Affordable Care Act (ACA)85 and most states 86 
require insurers to cover routine costs such as physician and hospital visits 
for patients in clinical trials. Other costs—such as procedures, tests, and 
80. Silverman, supra note 31. In a survey by the consulting fi rm Avalere Health, only 19 of 
100 drug makers had publicly available policies about how to request access to experimental 
medicines. Brenda HuneyCutt, Nina Mermelsten & Gillian Woder, “Current State of Transparency 
of Manufacturer’s Compassionate Use Policies,” 2 (October 2016), online: <go.avalere.com/acton/
attachment/12909/f-0354/>.
81. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub L No 114-255 §3032, 130 stat 1033 at 1100 (2016); see supra notes 
2-3.
82. Ibid. The policy posting must include contact information for compassionate-use requests; 
instructions on making such requests; information on how such requests are evaluated; and links to 
clinical trial information. But posting the drug maker’s policy does “not serve as a guarantee of access 
to any specifi c investigational drug by any individual patient,” nor does it preclude the drug maker 
from changing its policy. 
83. See notes 76-87.
84. Carrie Feibel, “Patients Demand The ‘Right To Try’ Experimental Drugs, But Costs Can Be Steep,” 
NPR Shots (3 March 2017), online: <www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/03/03/517796956/
patients-demand-the-right-to-try-experimental-drugs-but-costs-can-be-steep>; NYU Langone Health 
Working Group, supra note 56. (“Because drug makers aren’t required to grant access to their 
investigational products, the laws create the false hope in desperately ill people that they can obtain 
something they may, in fact, not be able to get. And, some state right to try laws strip patients who use 
right to try of important benefi ts, such as health insurance or access to home healthcare.”) Supra note 
67, S 204 §2(a) references FDA regulations, 21 CFR §312(d)(1), that allow a drug maker to recover 
“direct costs” for supplying an experimental drug. See the text preceding footnote 71 above.
85. 42 USC § 300gg-8; National Cancer Institute, “Insurance Coverage and Clinical Trials,” (22 
June 2016), online: <www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/clinical-trials/paying/insurance>. 
However, some providers have argued insurers are not following this mandate. Christine Mackay et 
al, “Insurance denials for cancer clinical trial participation after the Affordable Care Act mandate,” 
(2017) 123:15 Cancer 2893.
86. Kelly Johnson, “Payers Still Denying Coverage Despite Clinical Trial Mandate,” OncLive (29 
March 2016), online: <www.onclive.com/publications/oncology-business-news/2016/april-2016/
payers-still-denying-coverage-despite-clinical-trial-mandate?p=2>.
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therapies specifi cally related to the clinical trial—generally are covered by 
the drugmaker or the sponsor of the clinical trial. 87
 II. The right to die and related issues
In contrast to the right to try, recognition of a “right to die” has been much 
less successful politically, and the debate has been handled very differently 
in the states than at the federal level. At one end, a handful of states have 
allowed patients to seek medical assistance to end their own life when they 
are affl icted with a terminal, debilitating illness. But even efforts to ensure 
that individuals understand their options at the end of life and plan for such 
situations have led to angry, misleading rhetoric. 
 1. Federal law and policy
While the policy-making arms of the federal government have been swayed 
by changes in the political environment, federal law and policy consistently 
have attempted to encourage individuals to think through their wishes for 
the end of their lives but stopped well short of medical-aid-in-dying. The 
following section explores the key policies and decisions framing—and 
limiting—an individual’s right to die from a federal perspective.
 a. Federal jurisprudence: no recognition of a constitutional right
In terms of judicial decisions, the courts have recognized that individuals 
have a general right to refuse medical treatment.88 In the seminal Quinlan 
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court grounded that right to refuse in 
its fi nding of the right to privacy within the U.S. Constitution.89 But more 
commonly, “most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either solely 
on the common-law right to informed consent or on both the common-law 
right and a constitutional privacy right.”90 In other words, if an individual 
had a right to refuse to be touched, as the touch would constitute common-
law battery, then a physician who performed an operation on an unwilling 
patient without consent similarly committed a battery.91
The Supreme Court furthered this analysis in Cruzan when the parents 
of Nancy Cruzan, a woman in a vegetative state, sued the state of Missouri 
in order to halt her life-sustaining treatment.92 While the Court assumed 
for purposes of the case that a competent person could permissibly refuse 
life-sustaining treatment under the Constitution, Cruzan here was not 
87. Ibid.
88. Cruzan v Missouri Dept of Health, 497 US 261 at 270 (1990).
89. In re Quinlan, 355 A(2d) 647, (NJ 1976).
90. Cruzan, supra note 88 at 271.
91. Ibid at 269.
92. Ibid at 266-268.
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competent to make such a decision and thus Missouri could seek to ensure 
a decision to remove life-sustaining medical assistance was being made 
in accordance with her wishes.93 The Court found that a surrogate could 
make that decision for her but Missouri could require that the surrogate 
must demonstrate they were acting in accordance with what her wishes 
would have been had she been competent.94
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals can 
refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining care, the Court has 
rejected claims that a right to die can be found in our federal Constitution 
in a pair of 1997 cases, fi nding that neither the Equal Protection Clause 95 
nor the Due Process Clause96 in the Fourteenth Amendment provided a 
basis for such a right. The Court noted that there was no history, tradition, 
or practice in support of medical aid in dying; rather, even though states 
were moving away from punishing suicide, they had “engaged in serious, 
thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar 
issues” and had decided not to revise prohibitions on such assistance. 97 
While Cruzan acknowledged that a mentally-competent individual with a 
terminal illness could reject life-sustaining treatment, such a request was 
not rooted in “personal autonomy” at the end of life but “the long legal 
tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment”—
in other words, an individual has the ability to reject any medical treatment, 
and that ability is not contingent on whether he is dying.98 
Relatedly, the Court rejected the theory that a patient who rejects life-
sustaining treatment should be treated the same as a patient who seeks 
medical aid in dying, and therefore criminalizing assisted suicide was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause: “when a patient refuses life-
sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease 
or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a 
physician, he is killed by that medication.”99 Further, a person may reject 
medical treatment for very different reasons than why another person 
might seek medical aid in dying.100
93. Ibid at 279-281.
94. Ibid at 281-87.
95. Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793 (1997).
96. Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997).
97. Ibid at 716-719; Tom Beauchamp, “The Right to Die as the Triumph of Autonomy,” (2006) 31:6 
J Medicine & Philosophy 643 at 648.
98. Glucksberg, supra note 96 at 725.
99. Vacco, supra note 95 at 801.
100. Ibid at 802.
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 b. Federal policies around end-of-life options
Several federal policies on end-of-life decisions were made in reaction 
to these judicial decisions. For example, following Cruzan, Congress 
passed the Patient Self-Determination Act (PDSA), 101 which required 
certain providers to inform patients about advance directives and to 
ensure a patient’s advance directive, if one existed, was included as 
part of the patient’s records.102 Second, Congress subsequently moved 
to restrict medical aid in dying by passing the Federal Assisted Suicide 
Funding Restriction Act 103 just months prior to the Court’s Glucksberg and 
Vacco decisions.104 The act prohibits the use of federal health funding “to 
cause (or assist in causing) the suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing of 
any individual” except in cases where the individual sought to withdraw 
medical treatment. 105 Additionally, this law amended the PSDA to prohibit 
providers from notifying individuals about any state policies on physician-
aid-in-dying.106 
Other federal policy considerations of end-of-life issues have focused 
more on the provision of care such as hospice or on issues similar to the 
PSDA such as advance care planning and counseling. 107 Proponents note 
that pursuing such policies would enable patients to receive the care they 
want at the end of life. 108 However, even these policy proposals sometimes 
lead to political uproars, which consequently causes a political retreat from 
pursuing such policies.109 Following federal intervention into a dispute 
between the parents and the husband of a woman in a vegetative state 
over whether to withdraw her treatment,110 Congress passed legislation 
including advance care planning as part of an initial “Welcome to Medicare” 
101. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub l No 101-508 § 4206, 104 Stat 1388 at 115-117.
102. US, Government Accounting Offi ce, Patient Self-Determination Act: Providers Offer 
Information on Advance Directives but Effectiveness Uncertain, (GAO/HEHS-95-135) (1995).
103. Pub L No 105-12, 111 Stat 23 (codifi ed at 42 U.S.C. § 14401 et seq ).
104. National Center for Public Policy Research, “The Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 
1997,” online: <web.archive.org/web/20171009162621/http://nationalcenter.org/AssistedSuicide397.
html> (noting that the law was passed in response to “federal courts of appeal [having] declared a 
constitutional right to assisted suicide” prior to the Supreme Court’s reversals).
105. Supra note 103 at § 2(b).
106. Ibid.
107. US, Institute of Medicine, Dying in America: Improving Quality and Honouring Individual 
Preferences Near the End of Life, (Washington DC: The National Academics Press, 2015) at 1-3.
108. Vyjeyanthi Periyakoil et al, “Do Unto Others: Doctors’ Personal End-of-Life Resuscitation 
Preferences and Their Attitudes toward Advance Directives,” (2014) 9:5 PLOS One e98246 at 1-2.
109. Peter Ubel, “Why It Is So Diffi cult to Kill the Death Panel Myth,” Forbes (9 January 2013), 
online: <www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/01/09/why-it-is-so-diffi cult-to-kill-the-death-panel-
myth>.
110. Josh Sanborn, “How Terri Schiavo Shaped the Right-to-Die Movement,” Time (31 March 2015), 
online: <www.time.com/3763521/terri-Schiavo-right-to-die-brittany-maynard/>. 
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benefi t for new Medicare benefi ciaries. 111 Just two years later, a political 
fi restorm erupted when conservative activists mischaracterized attempts 
to allow Medicare to pay for advance care planning in an early version of 
the Affordable Care Act.112 ACA opponents argued that providing end-of-
life counseling would incentivize physicians to push vulnerable patients 
to opt for less care.113 Other opponents tapped into a general fear of a 
“government takeover” of healthcare to argue that the ACA would lead 
to a government-run system, and the counseling provision would lead to 
“death panels” where government bureaucrats would ration care for older, 
sicker patients against their will. 114 Ultimately, the federal government did 
authorize reimbursement for physicians to counsel Medicare benefi ciaries 
about advance care planning as part of a larger payment regulation without 
much controversy.115 
 2. State law and policy
Proponents also have pursued policies at the state level to assist terminally 
ill patients. One reason that the debates have occurred at the state level 
may be due to our federalist system and the balance of powers between 
states and the federal government: states traditionally regulate the scope 
of medical services and liability issues, and medical assistance in dying 
would fall squarely in this area. 116 But another reason that some of these 
efforts have been successful is because of the environments in different 
states; generally, proponents have been only been successful in states that 
could be described either as more politically and culturally liberal than 
the country as a whole or as having more of a libertarian bent. 117 But even 
other “liberal” states such as Massachusetts and Maryland have failed 
to pass aid-in-dying proposals. 118 Only a handful of jurisdictions have 
111. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare’s Role in End-of-Life Care,” (26 September 2016), 
online: <kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/10-faqs-medicares-role-in-end-of-life-care/>.
112. US, Bill HR 3962, Affordable Health Care for America Act, 11th Cong, 2009.
113. Regina Lawrence & Matthew Schafer, “Debunking Sarah Palin: Mainstream news coverage of 
‘death panels,’” (2011) 13:6 Journalism 766.
114. Ibid; Sherrie Dulworth, “From Schiavo to Death Panels: How Media Coverage of End-of-Life 
Issues Affects Public Opinion,” (2014) 58:2 NYL Sch L Rev 391.
115. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 111; Paula Span, “A Quiet End to the ‘Death Panels’ 
Debate,” New York Times (20 November 2015), online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/health/end-
of-death-panels-myth-brings-new-end-of-life-challenges.html>.
116. George Annas, “Congress, Controlled Substances, and Physician-Assisted Suicide—Elephants 
in Mouseholes” (2006) 354:10 New Eng J Med 1079 at 1082-1084; Beauchamp, supra note 97 at 647.
117. While some of the states that have adopted a right to die by statute or ballot initiative may 
be considered politically liberal, some of the states—Colorado and Montana—might be better 
characterized as libertarian.
118. Dulworth, supra note 114; Anna Hiatt, “It’s Not That I Want to Die. It’s That I Want to Control 
My Own Suffering,” Washington City Paper (24 July 2015), online: <www.washingtoncitypaper.com/
news/article/13047034/death-with-dignity-in-maryland>.
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legislated or passed via popular referendum a right to allow terminally-ill 
individuals the ability to seek medical assistance in dying: California,119 
Colorado,120 Hawaii,121 Oregon,122 Vermont,123 Washington,124 and the 
District of Columbia.125 Generally following the statutory framework 
adopted by Oregon, the fi rst state to pass such a law, these state aid-in-
dying laws contain similar safeguards and eligibility requirements to ward 
off abuse and coercion.126 Under the Oregon model, eligible patients must 
be a competent adult with a terminal illness, or a prognosis of six month 
or less of life as confi rmed by two physicians.127 The patient must follow 
a specifi c process to request the medication but can rescind the request at 
any time.128 Eligible patients cited the loss of autonomy due to the illness as 
the most common reason that they requested medical assistance. 129 Some 
patients who go through the entire process never take the medication at 
all, suggesting that having the medication and thus the choice to utilize it 
brings a sense of autonomy to the patient. 130
Finally, Montana is currently the only state to have recognized a similar 
right through litigation after the state supreme court held that physicians 
do not violate state law if they assist patients in dying.131 In analyzing the 
119. US, AB 15, End of Life Option Act, 2015-2016, 2d Extra Sess, Cal. A state court struck down the 
law due to a violation of the legislative process, and the case is currently on appeal. Scott Neuman, 
“Court Upholds Ruling Against California’s Assisted Suicide Law,” NPR: The Two-Way (24 May 
2018), online: <www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/24/613940700/court-upholds-ruling-
against-californias-assisted-suicide-law>.
120. US, Prop 106, End of Life Options Act, 2016, Colo, (passing by voter referendum).
121. US, SB 1129, Medical Aid in Dying Act, 29th Legis, 2017, Hawaii.
122. 3 ORS § 127.800 (2017).
123. 18 VSA § 113.5281 as amended by S 108, Act. 27, 2015-2016, Reg Sess, Vt (removing sunset 
date of 2015 in originally legislation).
124. 70 Wash Rev. Code § 245 (2017) (2008) (passing by voter referendum in November 2008).
125. 7 DC Code § 661.01 (2017).
126. Death with Dignity National Center, “How do Aid-In-Dying Laws Protect Patients?,” online: 
<www.deathwithdignity.org/faqs/#safeguards>.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Charles Blanke et al, “Characterizing 18 Years of the Death With Dignity Act in Oregon,” (April 
2017) JAMA Oncology 1403 (fi nding that 92% of patients cited loss of autonomy, nearly 90% cited 
the inability to “participate in enjoyable activities,” and nearly 79% cited loss of dignity as reasons for 
requesting aid in dying).
130. Chuck Gormley, “Physician-aided deaths continue to rise in Oregon,” HEM/ONC Today (6 April 
2017), online: <www.healio.com> (noting that some “patients do not take the medication prescribed. 
Nonetheless, having the prescription still benefi ts the patient in terms of having control over his or her 
life or death.”)
131. Baxter v State, 224 P(3d) 1211 (Mont 2009). Although a New Mexico state court ruled that a 
law prohibiting medical aid in dying was unconstitutional, the state supreme court reversed, declining 
to fi nd a “constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying.” Morris v Brandenburg, 376 P(3d) 836 
at 839 (N Mex 2016); Scott Sandlin, “New Mexico Assisted Suicide Law Affi rmed,” Albuquerque 
Journal (30 June 2016), online: <www.abqjournal.com/801082/nm-supreme-court-rules-on-aid-in-
dying-workers-comp.html>.
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state statute on “deliberate homicide,” the Montana supreme court noted 
the statute recognizes the consent of the victim as a potential defense if, 
among other elements, such a consent is not “against public policy.”132 
The court noted Montana had passed the Montana Rights of the Terminally 
Ill Act,133 which did not include physician-aid-in-dying134 but did “very 
clearly provide[] that terminally ill patients are entitled to autonomous, 
end-of-life decisions, even if enforcement of those decisions involves 
direct acts by a physician” such as removing life-sustaining treatment.135 
Thus, the court found the Terminally Ill Act did not contravene public 
policy and a physician would be able to claim a consent defense against a 
homicide charge.136 However, since the Baxter decision, Montana has not 
established a regulatory scheme to regulate medical aid-in-dying nor has it 
amended state law to overturn Baxter legislatively.137
Paralleling the question of whether federal law could preempt state 
right-to-try laws, there is an open question whether the federal government 
could intervene in state medical-aid-in-dying programs.138 Noting 
Glucksberg’s praise in favor of states debating medical aid in dying,139 
the Supreme Court’s review of a Justice Department regulation, which 
would have criminalized Oregon’s aid-in-dying program, turned narrowly 
on its interpretation of the federal Controlled Substances Act.140 Although 
the Court noted that states traditionally regulated what was a “legitimate 
medical purpose,” its decision turned on “the statute’s text and design.”141 
Thus, Congress could modify the statute in an attempt to overturn the 
Court’s decision.142 Additionally, because of Congress’s authority over 
132. Baxter, ibid at 1215.
133. 50 Mont ch 9 § 204 et seq.
134. For a discussion of the Montana law, see “Montana Euthanasia Laws,” Findlaw, online: 
<statelaws.fi ndlaw.com/montana-law/montana-euthanasia-laws.html>. 
135. Baxter, supra note 131 at 1217.
136. Ibid at 1220.
137. “Montana,” Death with Dignity National Center, online: <www.deathwithdignity.org/states/
montana/>.
138. Annas, supra note 116, at 1083 (noting “there is no longer any serious question that Congress has 
the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the practice of medicine”).
139. Gonzales v Oregon 546 US 243 at 253-54 (2006) (referring to Glucksberg, supra note 97 at 
735. (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the 
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”))
140. Gonzales, ibid at 253-254.
141. Ibid at 269-270.
142. Annas, supra note 116 at 1083-1084.
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the District of Columbia’s budget,143 some representatives have attempt to 
override its aid-in-dying law.144
 III. Comparing and contrasting the right to try with the right to die and 
related policies
Given both “rights” present different choices for those at the end of life, 
there are questions about whether both choices should be given some level 
of equivalency or whether it is fair to give one more weight than the other. 
Are they not both attempting to give someone at the end of life a range 
of options? While the right to try has its fl aws, 145 its successes should be 
studied to understand whether there are political, ethical, or legal arguments 
that proponents of right-to-die proposals can adopt to advance their ideas. 
 1. Policy and ethical considerations
On one hand, several similarities are readily evident between the right to 
try and the right to die. First as a process matter, both involve an affi rmative 
request for a drug that is outside its either known or intended use. Our 
general public health interest is for drugs to cure, not to harm.146 The FDA’s 
role in the drug approval process is built on this interest. But in medical-
aid-in-dying programs, the drug is used to end a life. In instances of a right 
to try, the patient’s hope is that an experimental drug will be curative, but 
given the experimental nature, we cannot be sure the drug will achieve 
this hoped-for purpose because it has not been proven safe and effective.147 
Indeed, an experimental drug could be harmful and worsen a terminally-ill 
patient’s condition.148 
Second, supporters of either right often ground their arguments in the 
concepts of self-determination and personal autonomy: if an individual 
is dying, then they should be able to take their fi nal steps on their own 
143. Mark Richards, “A Citizen’s Guide to the Congressional Appropriations Process for the 
District of Columbia,” DC Vote (February 2002), online: <www.dcvote.org/public-opinion/
citizens%E2%80%99-guide-congressional-appropriations-process-district-columbia>.  This power 
distinguishes congressional authority over the District in contrast to the debate in Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 US 243 (2006).
144. Death with Dignity National Center, “District of Columbia,” online: <www.deathwithdignity.
org/states/district-of-columbia/>; Jenna Portnoy & Peter Jamison, “House Committee Advances 
Measure to Block Assisted Suicide in D.C.,” Washington Post (14 July 2017), online: <www.
washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/house-committee-advances-measure-to-block-assisted-
suicide-in-dc/2017/07/14/72166bde-67f5-11e7-a1d7-9a32c91c6f40_story.html?&utm_term=.
C5e71672C252>.
145. Supra notes 76-87; Kaplan, supra note 78; David Farber et al, “How State Right-To-Try 
Laws Create False Expectations,” (22 May 2017) Health Affairs (blog), online: <healthaffairs.org/
blog/2015/05/22/how-state-right-to-try-laws-create-false-expectations/>.
146. Supra notes 10-16.
147. See supra notes 16-18.
148. See supra notes 76-78.
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terms.149 Of course, this rationale glosses over the fact that the individual 
cannot accomplish his goal on his own—he needs the assistance of a health 
professional and of medication to effectuate his goal.150 Indeed, the Court 
noted this affi rmative need as a basis for differentiating between medical 
aid in dying and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.151 The reliance on 
the actions of a health professional of course raise additional issues such as 
the professional’s concerns about liability and professional responsibilities 
as well as ethical views on administering a lethal or an experimental drug 
to a patient.152 In the right-to-try context, a patient successfully exercising 
such a right also may impinge on the success of a clinical trial and the 
welfare of the trial’s participants—and future patients— if there are limited 
quantities of the experimental drug.153
Third, both rights fulfi ll a need for closure. On one hand, if the 
individual is allowed access to an experimental drug, at least he will know 
whether that drug would have made any difference. 154 Many advocates 
for a right to try noted that their advocacy was driven by not knowing the 
answer to that question.155 On the other hand, if an individual is seeking 
medical aid in dying, she will achieve closure in ending a struggle with a 
terminal illness or condition on her own terms, rather than on the disease or 
condition’s progression.156 Similarly, both rights may be seen as achieving 
the ethical notion of mercy as in both situations, society is attempting to 
149. Compare Blanke, supra note 129 (noting autonomy as the most cited reason for patients to 
seek state program for medical aid in dying) with Corieri, supra note 32 at 1. (“Patients should be 
free to exercise a basic freedom—attempting to preserve one’s own life.”) There also are other areas 
where states allow a competent individual to elect state aid in ending his life. Melanie Walthour, 
“Competently, Knowingly, and Voluntarily Dying with Dignity: Why States that Allow Defendants 
to Volunteer for Execution Should Allow Terminally Ill Patients to Die in a Dignifi ed and Humane 
Manner,” (2016) 9:2 Ariz Summit L Rev 437 at 439 (comparing medical aid in dying to states allowing 
defendants sentenced to execution to waive their appeals).
150. Beauchamp, supra note 97 at 648.
151. Glucksberg, supra note 96 at 725-726. (“Pointing to Casey and Cruzan, respondents read our 
jurisprudence in this area as refl ecting a general tradition of ‘self-sovereignty,’ and as teaching that 
the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes ‘basic and intimate exercises of personal 
autonomy.’ The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts 
of personal autonomy.”); Beauchamp, supra note 97, at 648 (noting the right to die “shifted… 
from refusals of medical technologies to requests for aid in hastening death”). Compare this result 
though with Baxter, which is the only case to affi rm medical-aid-in-dying through a statutory, not 
constitutional, interpretation. Baxter, 224 P(3d) at 1211 (fi nding “an apt statutory starting point for 
understanding the legislature’s intent to give terminally ill patients…end-of-life autonomy, respect and 
assurance that their life-ending wishes will be followed”).
152. Meyerson, supra note 8 at 395, 398.
153. Caplan, supra note 78.
154. Corieri, supra note 32, at 1; Tedeschi, supra note 77. 
155. Ibid.
156. Supra notes 118-130.
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fi nd a way to fi nd an end—or a potential end— to suffering.157 Even if an 
experimental drug does not work, the argument is that at least an individual 
may feel both closure and mercy by knowing a dying wish was fulfi lled.158
 Other end-of-life policies such as advance care planning can also 
provide a sense of closure as counseling and planning can help us understand 
and work through the consequences of our choices about the end of life. 
Simply going through advance care planning does not necessarily mean 
that an individual will choose a “do not resuscitate” or similar option,159 
but it does make one realize that choosing a path that extends life might 
not extend it in a way that we all may be comfortable with.160 Through such 
counseling, individuals may have a better understanding of the risks and 
success rates of different medical inventions and having this knowledge 
will give them a say in how they want to receive care at the end of their 
life and what they feel makes a life worth living.161 It may also give them 
peace of mind by relieving loved ones of having to make these diffi cult 
decisions for them.162
On the other hand, the ultimate difference between the two rights is 
fi nality.163 With the right to try, if I am terminally ill but do not successfully 
respond to an experimental drug, I will succumb to my illness.164 With the 
157. Compare Corieri, supra note 32, at 1 (quoting a parent who did not receive compassionate-use 
approval before his daughter died, “I don’t know that either of these drugs would have saved [her] life, 
but wouldn’t it be nice to give her a chance?”) with Hiatt, supra note 118 (quoting testimony from a 
supporter of a Maryland bill to allow medical aid in dying, “We are dying in pain, and we want control 
over our end.”)
158. See the text accompanying note 154 above.
159. Institute of Medicine, supra note 107, at 12. (“People who capture their care preferences in 
discussion or writing most commonly choose care that focuses on improving quality of life.”)
160. Ibid. (“In the absence of adequate documented advance care planning, the default decision is to 
treat a disease or condition, no matter how hopeless or painful. A result of inadequate advance care 
planning, therefore, can be more intensive treatment, as well as more negative impacts on family 
members.”); Periyakoil, supra note 108, at 7-8. 
161. Institute of Medicine, supra note 107 at 12.
162. Ibid; Periyakoil, supra note 108 at 1-2.
163. Note that the Johnson bill is different from most right-to-try laws and the competing House 
proposal because it uses the term “life threatening” rather than terminal. See the text accompanying 
note 69 above. Given that this term could apply to “diseases that are life-threatening, but not 
immediately life-threatening,” it is unclear how this language will apply in practice even though it did 
not seem to undermine the political messaging of the bill being a means for ending only the terminally 
ill. Firth, supra note 77 (quoting FDA Commissioner Gottlieb).
164. However, it may not be possible to know what the health consequences of taking an experimental 
drug will be, particularly to a body that is succumbing to a fatal disease or condition. An individual 
could experience great harm or even death from taking an experimental drug.
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right to die, the consequences are more obvious and fi nal.165 Even in cases 
where a patient obtains medication to end his life but does not utilize it, 
that individual still is making a fi nal decision through having the drug 
accessible and at the ready.166 
Moreover, the right to try may not provide fi nality since it does not 
create enforceable rights: the drugmaker and the insurer do not have any 
obligation under any right-to-try legislation to provide access to the drug 
or pay for the services that may be necessary to administer it.167 Because 
there are no such requirements, ethicists have noted that right-to-try laws 
not only give patients the false hope that they might be cured of their illness 
but also that they will receive experimental drugs in the fi rst place.168 What 
then is the next step for a terminally ill patient if a drugmaker denies a 
request for access to an experimental drug? If it is meaningless to create a 
hollow right that has no means of enforcement, would not the next logical 
step be to require pharmaceutical companies to allow all terminally ill 
patients access to experimental drugs?169 Such a proposal would have to 
address issues around cost (who will pay for the experimental drug? who 
will pay to administer it?), liability (does the patient and his family have 
no legal recourse if the health professional fails to administer the dose 
correctly?), and process (how does such use fi gure into a clinical trial? do 
poor results need to be included?). But the right to try does fi t in with our 
notions of hope—whether false or not—and our society’s tradition that 
medicine should be to heal. That explains in part why lawmakers are more 
ready to pass right-to-try laws, which create some sense of hope even if 
that hope is artifi cial.170 
 2. Legal questions arising from the political and ethical similarities
Given that there are similarities that can be drawn from comparing these 
two statutory rights, proponents of a right to die should question whether 
the legislature can favor one set of wishes over another at the end of life. 
Initially, it would seem that there is no constitutional issue similar to Vacco 
165. The Supreme Court suggested as much when it rejected fi nding a right to die within the 
Constitution and pointed to the legislature for guidance. Supra note 95-101. “Public concern and 
democratic action are therefore sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at 
the end of life, with the result that there have been many signifi cant changes in state laws and in the 
attitudes these laws refl ect.” Glucksberg, supra note 96 at 716.
166. Supra note 129-130.
167. Supra notes 76-87.
168. Farber, supra note 145.
169. Okie, supra note 47 at 439 (discussing a prior effort to give terminally-ill patients a broader right 
of access to experimental drugs that had only gone through the fi rst stage of clinical trials).
170. Tedeschi, supra note 77. (“It’s hard to argue against when it’s framed as the terminally ill having 
the right to save their lives…. How do you argue against that?”)
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v. Quill, where the Supreme Court found that there was no equal-protection 
violation when a state distinguished between terminally ill patients who 
refuse medical treatment with those that want medical aid in dying.171 
The Court found these situations were different because “when a patient 
refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal 
disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed 
by a physician, he is killed by that medication.”172 The Court reasoned 
a patient’s rationale for rejecting treatment may be very different from 
someone seeking aid in dying and thus a state could ban such assistance 
without violating the Equal Protection Clause.173
Yet the two classes discussed in Vacco are different from the two 
classes in that case. Here, a legislature is allowing someone to receive drugs 
(experimental and not FDA-approved) in hopes of a curative outcome but 
not receive drugs (being used outside its FDA-approved curative intent) 
for the purpose of dying. With the “right to try” measures, policymakers 
are arguably creating a division among the terminally ill as some can make 
a choice for assistance where others cannot.  
Something feels “unequal” in allowing some terminally ill patients 
to choose one path but not the other. Is these not two similar classes of 
individuals, those at the end of life seeking drugs outside a federally-
approved process? After all, as one California proponent of the right to try 
argued, if a state allowed the right to die, it should allow the right to try.174 
Wouldn’t the opposite be true as well? But where legislatures have passed 
a right to try, they have created a right only for certain patients only for one 
reason: to extend life potentially. That reason is a very powerful rationale 
for making the division of course and might be enough to survive a legal 
challenge.
 Conclusion
The right to try and the right to die both stem from the same rationale: 
we should honor individuals’ wishes at the end of their life, and society 
ought to show mercy to those who are dying. Yet even though these two 
proposals may share similar rationales, they have been viewed quite 
differently in the policy and legislative arena.
171. Vaco v Quill, supra note 95 at 802-803.
172. Ibid at 801.
173. Ibid.
174. Feibel, supra note 84 (quoting the bill sponsor, Assemblyman Ian Calderon, that “[i]t’s inhumane 
to have a law on the books that allows you to end your own life, but no law on the books that allows 
you to fi ght to extend it”).
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The success of the right to try suggests that proponents of other end-
of-life policies—whether from the right to die to or even just seeking to 
ensure that individuals have greater access to end-of-life counseling—
ought to see whether they can make their arguments in the political and 
legal arenas by grounding them in these shared rationales. After all, people 
who can access all the information about end-of-life planning might still, 
in the end, choose to receive the full extent of care possible to extend their 
lives. But only with the end-of-life information that advance care planning 
provides is the choice truly meaningful and respectful.
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